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Abstract
Social insect colonies can be seen as a distinct form of biological organization because they
function as superorganisms. Understanding how natural selection acts on the emergence and main-
tenance of these colonies remains a major question in evolutionary biology and ecology. Here, we
explore this by using multi-type branching processes to calculate the basic reproductive ratios and
the extinction probabilities for solitary versus eusocial reproductive strategies. In order to derive
precise mathematical results, we use a simple haploid, asexual model. In general, we show that
eusocial reproductive strategies are unlikely to materialize unless large fitness advantages are gained
by the production of only a few workers. These fitness advantages are maximized through obli-
gate rather than facultative eusocial strategies. Furthermore, we find that solitary reproduction
is ‘unbeatable’ as long as the solitary reproductive ratio exceeds a critical value. In these cases,
no eusocial parameters exist that would reduce their probability of extinction. Our results help to
explain why the number of solitary species exceeds that of eusocial ones: eusociality is a high risk,
high reward strategy, while solitary reproduction is better at risk management.
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1 Introduction
Eusocial behavior occurs when individuals reduce their lifetime reproduction in order to help raise
their siblings (Wilson 1971; 1975). Eusocial colonies comprise two castes: one or a few reproductive
individuals and a (mostly) non-reproductive, worker caste. These societies thus contain a repro-
ductive division of labor where some individuals reproduce and others forage and provision the
young (Ho¨lldobler & Wilson 1990; 2009).
Insect species that have reached this remarkable level of social complexity have proven to be vastly
successful in nature, and are thought to comprise nearly 50% of the world’s insect biomass (Wilson
1971; 1990). Despite the apparent success of this strategy, only 2% of described insect species
are eusocial. Here, we use a mathematical approach to improve our understanding of why such a
successful life history strategy so rarely evolves.
Eusociality has originated only 12-15 times within the insects, and perhaps 20-25 times within
the entire animal kingdom (Wilson 1971; 1975). Most of these evolutionary origins have occurred
in the order Hymenoptera (the bees, ants, and wasps) where there has been a single origin in the
ants (Wilson 1971), 2-3 origins in the wasps (Hines et al. 2007), and 4-5 origins in the bees (Cardinal
& Danforth 2011; Gibbs et al. 2012). As a result, much focus has been placed on understanding the
factors favoring or disfavoring the evolution of eusociality within the social insects (Hamilton 1964;
1972; Andersson 1984; Crespi 1992; Crozier 2008; Strassmann et al. 2011).
A large but often overlooked emphasis has been placed on identifying some of the key ecological
factors associated with the evolution of eusociality. Several precursors for the origins of eusociality
have been proposed based on comparative analyses among social insect species – primarily the
feeding and defense of offspring within a nest (Andersson 1984). These behaviors are also frequently
associated with a subsocial life history, where parents and offspring overlap and occupy the nest
simultaneously (Gadagkar 2009; Hunt 2007; 1991; 2012; Gadagkar 1990; Bang & Gadagkar 2012).
In contrast to the relatively few origins of eusociality, losses or reversions back to solitary be-
havior, which depends on the degree of euscociality, appear to be much more common (a very
rough estimate indicates a minimum of 9 losses within the bees – nearly twice the number of ori-
gins; see (Wcislo & Danforth 1997; Cardinal & Danforth 2011)). This suggests that the evolution
of eusociality is difficult to both achieve and maintain. Despite this apparent difficulty, some taxa
have nonetheless evolved highly complex eusocial behaviors where caste differentiation is determined
during development and individuals no longer retain the ability to perform all of the tasks required
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to reproduce on their own (obligate eusociality) (Batra 1966; Crespi & Yanega 1995). As opposed
to facultatively social species where all individuals are capable of reproduction, obligately eusocial
species are often described as having crossed a “point of no return” where reversion to a solitary life
history is no longer possible (Wilson & Ho¨lldobler 2005).
Here we calculate the emergence and extinction probabilities of eusocial versus solitary reproduc-
tive strategies. We use the haploid version of a simple model of eusociality from Nowak et al. (2010).
In our model, solitary females produce offspring that leave the nest to reproduce individually, while
eusocial females produce a mix of offspring that remain in the natal nest and others that leave the
nest to establish new, eusocial nests. Those offspring that stay augment the size of the colony. We
assume that the key reproductive parameters (oviposition rate, successful raising of the young, and
expected lifespan of reproductive females) increase with colony size.
Our focus is not on explaining the origins of eusociality, which has already been modeled in Nowak
et al. (2010). Instead, we attempt to explain the rarity of this trait by calculating the extinction
probabilities of solitary versus eusocial reproduction in a stochastic model based on the theory of
branching processes (Harris 2002; Antia et al. 2003). We calculate the probability that a lineage
starting from a single, solitary individual faces extinction, and we compare this with the extinction
probability of a lineage that starts with a single, eusocial individual.
We find that eusociality is typically a riskier strategy than solitary reproduction unless eusocial
colonies can benefit from a large reproductive advantage with very small colony sizes. We also
find that, when it is available, obligate eusociality is a more successful strategy than facultative
eusociality. These results suggest that the evolution of eusociality is difficult because it requires
a high reproductive payoff generated by the immediate production of a small number of workers.
These findings can explain both why origins of eusociality are rare but hugely successful and why
reversions to solitary behavior also occur: compared to solitary reproduction, eusociality is a high
risk and high reward strategy.
2 Material and methods
Following the deterministic model of eusociality studied in Nowak et al. (2010), here we consider a
corresponding stochastic version for the case of asexual reproduction. This model-based approach
can be used to evaluate the probability that a single, eusocial foundress in a population of solitary
females (e.g., a eusocial mutant) will successfully give rise to a eusocial lineage. We explore this
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by varying three main parameters: birth rate, b, death rate, d, and offspring dispersal probability,
q. We relate these variables in two major ways: through the basic reproductive ratio, R0, and the
extinction probability, p, of a given lineage. These parameters are described in detail below.
A solitary individual reproduces at rate b0, and dies at rate d0. Each offspring of a eusocial
queen stays with their mother with probability q; otherwise she leaves to establish another new
colony with probability 1 − q. A eusocial queen with colony size i reproduces at rate bi and dies
at rate di. bi and di are sigmoid functions of the colony size i with the inflection point being at
the eusocial threshold m. For simplicity, let us start with assuming bi and di to be step functions
of i: for i < m, bi = b0 and di = d0; for i ≥ m, bi = b and di = d. Thus, eusociality confers
an enhanced reproductive rate and a reduced death rate for a queen whose colony size reaches the
eusocial threshold (i ≥ m): b > b0 and d < d0 (henceforth referred to as the “eusocial advantage”).
Later on, we will verify the robustness of our derived results using more general sigmoid functions.
A single foundress can either die or successfully start a lineage by giving birth to another repro-
ductive individual. Each queen reproduces independently of one another. In light of this, we can
use a multi-type branching process to calculate the ultimate extinction probability, p, of individual
founding females. This value represents the chance than a given lineage founded by a single female
will go extinct over time t → ∞. The converse of this is the emergence probability, 1 − p, or the
chance that a lineage founded by a single female will persist over time t→∞.
Since the daughters who stay with their mother assist to perform tasks for the colony, the whole
colony (consisting of a reproductive queen and non-reproductive workers) can be seen as a sort of
superorganism which differs in size and reproductive capacity (bi, di). We thus construct the type
space using colony size i (Fig. 1).
For an infinitesimal time interval, ∆t, a colony of size i dies with probability di∆t, increases
its size to i + 1 with probability qbi∆t, and gives rise to a new colony of size 1 with probability
(1 − q)bi∆t. When a colony reaches the maximal size M , the subsequent offspring are required to
leave the colony. Thus the colony of size M gives rise to a new colony of size 1 with probability
bM∆t. For simplicity, we do not consider worker mortality.
Let f i(x1, x2, . . . , xM ; t) denote the joint probability generating function for the number of
colonies of size j = 1, . . . ,M starting with a single colony of size i at time t. Using the back-
ward equation for this continuous-time multiplicative process, we have
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d1 d2 d3 dM
qb1 qb2 qbM−1
bM
(1− q)b3
(1− q)b2(1− q)b1
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the stochastic branching model. We describe the stochastic emer-
gence of eusociality using a continuous-time multi-type branching process, in which every colony of size
i can be regarded as the i-th type. We set as M the largest possible size of each eusocial colony, and
thus there are total M distinctive types. A colony of size i can transform into the one of size i+ 1 with
rate qbi, reproduces a new colony of size 1 with rate (1− q)bi, or dies with rate di.
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df i
dt
= di + qbif
i+1 + (1− q)bif1f i − (bi + di)f i, 1 ≤ i < M, (1)
dfM
dt
= dM + bMf
1fM − (bM + dM )fM , i = M. (2)
The initial condition is f i = xi, i = 1, . . . ,M .
The fixed points of the equations are the ultimate extinction probabilities, pi, starting from a
single colony of size i. We will give closed form solutions for the extinction probabilities for general
cases.
3 Results
A population of individuals cannot be sustained without sufficient reproduction (Holyoak et al.
2014). This gives rise to the notion of a ‘basic reproductive ratio’, R0, or the total expected number
of (reproductive) offspring produced by an individual during its lifetime. Simple deterministic
models show that supercritical reproduction R0 > 1 is required to sustain a population (e.g., births
must exceed deaths). Correspondingly, the condition R0 > 1 also ensures a stochastic supercritical
branching process in which the ultimate extinction probability of an individual is not definite but
less than one.
3.1 Solitary reproduction
Returning to our model, for q = 0 (e.g., all offspring disperse) the above Eq. (1) recovers the case
of solitary reproduction. The solitary basic reproductive ratio RS is
RS =
b0
d0
. (3)
The extinction probability, p0, of a single solitary individual can be easily found to be
p0 =
 d0/b0, RS > 1,1, RS ≤ 1. (4)
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3.2 Eusocial reproduction with M = 2
Let us consider the simplest possible case of eusociality, with M = 2 and m = 2. This scenario
gives us an intuitive understanding of the results obtained with more general cases. The extinction
probabilities satisfy the following equations:
d0 + qb0p2 + (1− q)b0p21 − (b0 + d0)p1 = 0, (5)
d+ bp1p2 − (b+ d)p2 = 0. (6)
where p1 and p2 denote the extinction probability of a colony of size 1 and 2, respectively.
Because of the eusocial advantage, we set b > b0 and d < d0. We also assume solitary reproduction
is supercritical, that is b0 > d0. We are primarily interested in the extinction probability of a single
eusocial queen, p1, which is a function of q:
p1 =
b (b0 + d0) + (1− q)b0d−
√
(b (b0 + d0) + (1− q)b0d) 2 − 4(1− q)b0b (qb0d+ d0 (b+ d))
2(1− q)b0b . (7)
The formula for p1 can be simplified for extremes values of q.
For q → 0,
p1 =
d0
b0
.
Note that this is also the ultimate extinction probability of a single “solitary” individual.
For q → 1,
p1 =
d0
b0 + d0
+
d
b
.
Furthermore, if the following condition holds,
b
d
>
b0
d0
(1 +
b0
d0
) (8)
we have dp1(q)dq < 0 and hence p1(q) is a decreasing function of q, which suggests that a eusocial
queen (0 < q ≤ 1) has a greater emergence probability than a solitary one. We also find that the
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eusocial basic reproductive ratio,
RE = b0(1− q)/(d0 + b0q) + bb0q/[d(d0 + b0q)]. (9)
Eusocial RE is greater than the solitary RS if
b
d
> 1 +
b0
d0
. (10)
Note that b0/d0 > 1, the critical b/d above which eusociality has a greater probability of emer-
gence than solitary (Eq.8), is larger than the b/d obtained by simply requiring that eusocial RE is
greater than solitary RS (Eq.10). This result can help us to understand why a higher eusocial RE
relative to a solitary RS alone is not sufficient to guarantee that a higher emergence probability for
a eusocial queen relative to a solitary female.
3.3 General case with M > 2
Supercritical condition for eusociality. We now turn to more general cases with M > 2
and m ≥ 2. For notational simplicity, let us define µi = biq for 1 ≤ i < M and µM = 0; νi = bi(1−q)
for 1 ≤ i < M and νM = bM . Let us now derive the condition for eusocial reproduction to be
supercritical. To do this, let us first obtain the expectation matrix K for the multi-type branching
process as given in Eqs. (1)-(2). The element of K is given by Kji =
∂fi(1,··· ,1;t)
∂xj
. Denote by yi the
mean number of colonies of size i and by y the vector of [y1, y2, · · · , yM ]. Then the mean behavior
of the branching process is described by
y˙ = Ky, (11)
which corresponds to the deterministic ordinary differential equations for eusocial reproduc-
tion (Nowak et al. 2010). The supercritical branching process requires α(K) > 0, where α(K) is the
spectral abscissa (the largest of the real parts of the eigenvalues) of the matrix K (Harris 2002).
Before proceeding further, let us define two matrices F = {Fij} and V = {Vij} as follows.
Fij =
 νi, i = 1, 1 ≤ j ≤M,0, otherwise, (12)
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Vij =

di + µi, i = j,
−µi−1, i = j + 1,
0, otherwise.
(13)
We can see that both F and V have clear biological interpretation and are the so-called ‘next-
generation’ matrices (Diekmann et al. 1990). The entry Fij of matrix F denotes the rate at which
a colony of size j produces new colonies of size i. The entry Vij of V denotes the (influx) rate at
which the class of colonies of size j move into the class of colonies of size i (i 6= j); the diagonal
entry (i, i) of V denotes the total outflux rate of colonies of size i, including the death rate and the
rate at which they move into other classes. The inverse of V is found to be
V −1ij =

1/(di + µi), i = j,∏i−1
k=j µk/
∏i
k=j(dk + µk), j < i < M,
0, otherwise.
(14)
It is straightforward to verify the following matrix decomposition:
K = F−V = (FV−1 − I)V.
We obtain the supercritical condition after some algebra (Diekmann & Heesterbeek 2000),
α(K) > 0↔ ρ(FV−1) > 1, (15)
where ρ(A) denotes the spectral radius of a matrix A. Therefore, the eusocial basic reproductive
ratio, RE , can be defined as ρ(FV
−1), and has a closed-form expression as follows.
RE =
M∑
i=1
νi
µi
i∏
j=1
µj
dj + µj
. (16)
It is worth noting that the eusocial RE is exactly the same as the one obtained by applying
the next-generation approach to the deterministic Eq. (4) (Diekmann et al. 1990). We obtain a
supercritical condition for eusociality based on the basic reproductive ratio (‘R0’). Eusociality has a
nonzero chance of emergence if the branching process is supercritical, i.e., α(K) > 0. This condition
is equivalent to RE = ρ(FV
−1) > 1. Accordingly, if the eusocial RE exceeds one, then eusociality
can eventually emerge with non-zero probability.
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Emergence probability. For general cases with M > 2, we can derive a closed form for
the emergence probability of a single eusocial queen, z1 = 1 − p1, as follows. Let the vector
z = [z1, z2, · · · , zM ], where zi is the emergence probability of a single colony with size i. Let
Λ = diag{ν1, · · · , νM} and I = diag{1, · · · , 1} (the M ×M identity matrix). Using zi = 1− pi, we
obtain the following ordinary differential equations for the time evolution of z after simple algebra:
z˙ = KT z− z1Λz, (17)
with the initial condition z(0) = [1, 1, · · · , 1]. The ultimate emergence probability can be given
by
KT z− z1Λz = (Λ−1KT − z1I)Λz = 0. (18)
For the supercritical branching process, we have zi > 0 for i = 1, · · · ,M . This leads to
det(Λ−1KT − z1I) = 0. (19)
It follows immediately that z1 is determined by the spectral abscissa of Λ
−1KT . Therefore, we
obtain the following closed-form solution for z1,
z1 = max{0, α(Λ−1KT )}. (20)
We note that this closed-form z1 agrees perfectly with the results obtained by numerically solving
the differential equations (Fig. 2).
Resilience against extinction: solitary reproduction vs. eusocial reproduction.
We were interested in whether a eusocial queen can always have a higher emergence probability
than a solitary individual given sufficiently large eusocial reproductive advantages. We find that
it is always possible to satisfy the condition that the eusocial RE is greater than the solitary RS .
Thus eusocial reproduction is a ‘high reward’ strategy. Counterintuitively, however, it is not always
possible for eusociality to have a lower extinction probability than solitary, no matter how large the
eusocial reproductive advantages are. Thus, it is also a ‘high risk’ strategy. To see why this is the
case, let us consider the most favorable scenario for eusociality: eusocial queens become immortal
once the colony reaches size m.
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In this case, the extinction risk of a eusocial colony lies in the intermediate transition steps and
reduces monotonically to zero until reaching the threshold size m. Note that q = 1 makes it fastest
for a single eusocial queen to reach the eusocial threshold and thus the immortal state. There is
no intermediate optimal q to this end. Therefore, if the extinction probability, p1, of a single queen
with full eusociality (q = 1) is lower than that of a single solitary individual, then it is advantageous
for the eusocial queen to utilize a fully eusocial strategy (q = 1) to minimize the risk of extinction.
To simplify our notations, we can normalize the birth and death rates with their sum bi+di in the
ordinary differential equations in Eq.1 without changing the original fixed points. Let ai = bi/(bi+di)
for 1 ≤ i ≤M . Then ai = a0 = b0/(b0 + d0) for i < m; ai = a = b/(b+ d) for i ≥ m. The extinction
probability, p1, of a single fully eusocial queen is
p1 =
m−1∑
i=1
(1− a0)ai−10 . (21)
The condition for p1 to be smaller than the extinction probability of a single solitary individual
p0 = (1− a0)/a0 is
Wm(a0) = a
m−1
0 + a
m−2
0 + · · ·+ a0 − 1 < 0. (22)
The above polynomial Wm(a0) = a
m−1
0 + a
m−2
0 + · · ·+ a0 − 1 always has a unique positive root,
denoted by rm, in (0, 1). Thus eusociality can have an advantage over solitary (in terms of lower
extinction probability) if and only if the ratio of solitary reproduction a0 = b0/(b0 + d0) < rm. This
yields the critical solitary RS(m) that always ensures solitary reproduction less prone to extinction
than eusocial reproduction for any given eusocial threshold m:
b0
d0
>
rm
1− rm = RS(m). (23)
For m = 2, r2 = 1. Even so, we stress that this does not mean that eusocial reproduction is less
subject to extinction than solitary reproduction for this case with m = 2, since this threshold r2
is calculated with assuming immortal eusocial queen (d = 0). In fact, for eusocial queens without
infinite lifespan (d > 0), it requires very large eusocial benefits to reduce the extinction risk than
solitary reproduction does. To see why, let us recall Eq. 8 which we derived for the simplest possible
case m = M = 2: e.g., when the solitary reproduction b0/d0 = 3, the eusocial reproduction needs to
satisfy b/d > b0/d0(1+ b0/d0) = 12 to guarantee a lower extinction probability than its counterpart,
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the solitary reproduction does.
For m = 3 we find
r3 =
√
5−1
2 ≈ 0.618,
RS(3) =
1+
√
5
2 ≈ 1.618,
We note that this critical value is the ‘golden ratio’. For m = 4,
r4 =
1
3
(
−1− 2
(17+3
√
33)
1/3 +
(
17 + 3
√
33
)1/3) ≈ 0.544,
RS(4) ≈ 1.193.
Because Wm−1(a0) < Wm(a0) = (1 − am0 )/(1 − a0) − 2, the unique root rm within (0, 1) for
Wm(a0) = 0 is monotonically decreasing with m and converges to 1/2 for large m values, which
implies that RS(m)→ 1 for large m. As a result, as the eusocial threshold m increases, it becomes
more likely that the solitary reproductive ratio b0/d0 exceeds the threshold RS(m), making it im-
possible for eusociality to have a higher probability of emergence than solitary. In other words, the
larger m, the more prone eusocial reproduction is to extinction than solitary reproduction.
3.4 Numerical results
We present numerical results to verify our theoretical predictions above. Figure 2 shows the emer-
gence probability and RE of eusociality as a function of the probability to stay, q, with increasing
eusocial birth rates b. For a small eusocial advantage, the emergence probability decreases mono-
tonically with q until reaching certain extinction. As the eusocial advantage further increases, the
emergence probability has a peak for intermediate values of q. Eusociality has a greater emergence
probability than solitary with a sufficiently large eusocial advantage and intermediate values of q.
As also shown in Fig. 2, eusociality will certainly go extinct if the eusocial RE falls below one. The
eusocial RE being greater than the solitary RS is not sufficient to guarantee that eusociality has a
higher emergence probability, although eusociality grows faster in the deterministic sense. Further-
more, the critical b based on the comparison of extinction probabilities is much larger than the one
obtained by comparing eusocial RE versus solitary RS .
Figure 3 plots the comparison of the two critical conditions for eusociality to have an advantage
over solitary: (a) a higher RE across the entire parameter space (b/d, q), and (b) a lower extinction
probability. It is shown that the supercritical condition for a single eusocial queen to emerge with
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Figure 2: Stochastic emergence of eusociality. The upper row (a) shows the RE of eusociality (Eq.10);
the horizontal solid lines are the critical threshold R0 = 1, while the horizontal dot dashed lines are the
solitary RS = b0/d0. The lower row (b) shows the ultimate emergence probability for one single eusocial
queen to establish surviving lineages; the horizontal dot dashed lines are the emergence probability
of a single solitary individual, (b0 − d0)/b0. The solid curves are the closed form evaluations of the
emergence probabilities as given in Eq. (20), and the circles are results obtained by numerically solving
the differential equations [Eq. (1-2)]. With increasing efficiency of eusocial reproduction (b), there exist
an intermediate range of q values such that a single eusocial queen has a higher emergence probability
than a solitary individual. Relating emergence probability to RE , we find that the condition for the
multi-type branching process to be supercritical (i.e., non-zero ultimate probability for eusociality to
emerge) is equivalent to requiring RE > 1. Parameters: m = 3, M = 100, b0 = 0.12, d0 = 0.1, d = 0.05.
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Figure 3: Stochastic emergence and R0. The plot compares the critical conditions for eusociality to
have an advantage over solitary, in terms of higher R0 and higher stochastic emergence respectively,
across the parameter space (b/d, q). In the left panel (a), the grey-shaded area denotes the eusocial
RE < 1, in the red-shaded area, eusociality has a lower R0 than solitary, and in the blue-shaded area,
eusociality has a higher R0 than solitary. In the right panel (b), the grey-shaded area denotes definite
extinction of eusociality, in the red-shaded area, eusociality has a lower emergence probability than
solitary, and in the blue-shaded area, eusociality has a higher emergence probability than solitary. We
show that the branching process is supercritical, which is equivalent to RE > 1. Therefore, the grey-
shaded areas in both panels are identical. The critical eusocial advantage, b/d, above which eusociality
has a higher emergence probability than solitary, is much higher than the one above which eusocial RE
is greater than solitary RS . Parameters: m = 3, M = 100, b0 = 0.12, d0 = 0.1, d = 0.05.
14
nonzero probability is exactly equivalent to requiring the eusocial RE > 1 as given in Eq.10. Note
that the grey regions in the two panels of Fig. 3 are identical. The critical eusocial reproduction
advantages for eusociality to emerge at a higher probability than solitary are much larger than
eusocial RE simply exceeding the solitary RS (note the blue region in the right panel is much
smaller, compared with the left panel in Fig. 3).
This result can be intuitively understood as follows. Starting with a single founder queen, each
surviving eusocial colony is likely to go through intermediate stepwise transitions until reaching
the largest possible size M . Meanwhile, unlike solitary individuals, when a eusocial colony dies, it
inevitably results in the simultaneous loss of all individuals belonging to that colony; much repro-
ductive potential of these colonies with intermediate sizes is thus being wasted. As a consequence,
much larger reproductive advantages are needed to offset such inefficiency of eusocial reproduction
with respect to averting the risk of extinction.
Figure 4: Eusocial reproduction may be no better than solitary at averting the risk of extinction. The
left panel (a) shows the region where eusocial RE is larger than solitary RS . The right panel (b) shows
the region where eusociality has a greater chance of emergence than solitary. Eusociality can have a
greater probability of emergence than solitary only when the ratio of solitary reproduction b0/(b0 +d0)
is less than a critical threshold, rm. For the eusocial threshold m = 3, rm =
√
5−1
2 , rm decreases with
m and converges to 1/2 for large m. In contrast, eusociality can always have a larger R0 than solitary
for any given ratio of solitary reproduction d0/(b0 + d0). Parameters: m = 3, M = 100.
Figure 4 depicts the parameter region of reproductive rates where eusociality has a higher RE
(left panel) and has a higher emergence probability (right panel) than solitary RS , respectively. The
numerical result demonstrates that while it is always possible for eusociality to have a larger R0
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than solitary, it is not always possible for eusociality to have a higher emergence probability than
solitary. Specifically, for a eusocial threshold m = 3 and when the ratio of solitary reproductive
rates, b0/(b0 + d0) > (
√
5 − 1)/2, eusocial reproduction always imposes a higher risk of extinction
to the founding queen, regardless of how advantageous eusocial reproduction may be. It is worth
noting this is the “golden ratio” which ensures the superiority of solitary reproduction in averting
the risk of extinction. For a wide range of solitary reproduction rates (R0 > (1 +
√
5)/2 ≈ 1.618),
eusociality is always more prone to extinction than solitary. Furthermore, as shown before, the
critical ratio rm, of solitary reproduction rates precipitately plunges with large m. For instance,
m = 5, rm ≈ 0.519. This suggests that even if solitary reproduction is only slightly supercritical, a
large eusocial threshold (e.g., m ≥ 5) is the barrier to the emergence of eusociality, making eusocial
reproduction much more vulnerable to the risk of extinction. These results are particularly useful
in understanding the rarity of eusociality.
3.5 Model Extension I: Facultative vs Obligate Eusociality
In the previous section, we demonstrated that eusocial strategies have the greatest emergence prob-
ability with intermediate values of q, suggesting that facultatively eusocial strategies – those where
all daughters are capable of individual reproduction – might be the most successful in the earliest
stages of social evolution. These calculations were performed under the assumption that there is a
uniform probability to stay, q, for any colony size 1 ≤ i < M . However, it is also plausible that q
may depend on the colony size i. For simplicity, we consider a step function for the q profile: qi = q0
for i < m, and qi = q1 for i ≥ m.
We ask which q0 and q1 values maximize the basic reproductive ratio, RE , as well as the emer-
gence probability, z1. It is straightforward to adapt the previously derived formula for RE (Eq. 16)
and z1 (Eq. 20) for this extended case. Figure 5 plots the eusocial RE and emergence probabil-
ity z1 as a function of the parameter space (q0, q1), with increasing eusocial reproduction rates b,
respectively.
For small b values, solitary reproduction (e.g., qi = 0) is most resilient against extinction and has
the largest R0 value. For sufficiently large b values, q0 = 1, and intermediate q1 ∈ (0, 1) maximize
RE while q0 = 1, and q1 = 0 maximize the emergence probability. Thus, our results suggest that
facultative eusociality can emerge in conditions where there is a large reproductive payoff and small
colony sizes, but that if a queen is capable of producing an obligate worker caste, this is the most
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Figure 5: Optimum probability to stay. We consider a step function for the probability for offspring
to stay in the nest, qi, that depends on the colony size i: qi = q0 for i < m, qi = q1 for i ≥ m, and
qM = 0. The upper row (a) shows the eusocial basic reproductive ratio RE as a function of (q0, q1)
with increasing eusocial reproduction rate b. The lower row (b) shows the emergence probability as a
function of (q0, q1) with increasing eusocial reproduction rate b. For small b values, qi = 0 maximize
both RE and emergence probability. For large b values, q0 = 1, and q1 = 0 maximize emergence
probability, while q0 = 1, and intermediate q1 ∈ (0, 1) maximize RE . Given large eusocial advantages,
this result shows that obligate eusociality is optimal for small colony sizes; namely, it is always optimal
for a queen to produce workers first followed by a burst of reproductives sent out to establish new
colonies. All parameters as in Fig. 2.
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advantageous strategy. In other words, while both facultative and obligate eusociality are capable of
emerging (given the appropriate conditions), it is optimal for a queen to produce an obligate worker
caste first, followed by reproductives in order to maximize the reproductive potential of the colony.
3.6 Model Extension II: Sigmoid Functions of Eusocial Reproduction
It is not implausible that ecological benefits begin to accrue in eusocial colonies of small size below
the threshold m. Without loss of generality, therefore, we use the following sigmoid functions to
characterize the ecological parameters governing eusocial reproduction:
bi = b(i) = b0 + (b− b0) (i− 1)
αb
(i− 1)αb + (mb − 3/2)αb , (24)
di = d(i) = d0 + (d− d0) (i− 1)
αd
(i− 1)αd + (md − 3/2)αd , (25)
qi = q(i) = 1− (i− 1)
αq
(i− 1)αq + (mq − 3/2)αq , (26)
where αb, αd, and αq (mb, md, and mq) are the sigmoid coefficients (thresholds) for birth rate bi,
death rate di, and probability to stay qi, respectively.
Note that parameters αb, αd, and αq control the steepness of the sigmoid functions, and for large
values, the step functions with the thresholds mb, md, and mq are recovered as before. With increas-
ing the values of mb, md, and mq larger colony size is required to confer substantial eusocial benefits
as well as to produce reproductives, thus making it more difficult for eusociality to emerge (Figs. 6a,
6c, and 6e). Different from step functions, assuming sigmoid functions for eusocial birth and death
rates confers ecological benefits for small colony size below the threshold m, thus promoting the
emergence of eusociality (Figs. 6a and 6c). In contrast, assuming a step function for the probability
to stay optimalizes the chance for eusociality to emerge, compared to the sigmoid function (Fig. 6e).
Under the assumption of sigmoid functions, there still exist critical solitary reproduction rates such
that no parameters of eusocial reproduction can lower the extinction probability (Figs. 6b, 6d and
6f). These results confirm the robustness of our above conclusion that eusocial reproduction is in
general more subject to extinction than solitary lifestyle. Moreover, our work suggests further po-
tential empirical testing aimed at characterizing the eusocial advantages using the colony size, since
to the best of our knowledge there is currently lack of accurate data to this end.
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Figure 6: Sigmoid functions. Panels a, c, and e show the emergence probability of a single eusocial
queen as a function of the sigmoid coefficients of eusocial birth rate, αb, eusocial death rate, αd,
probability to stay, αq, respectively. Panels b, d, and f plot the emergence probability of a single
eusocial queen versus a solitary individual as a function of the normalized solitary reproduction rate
b0/(b0 + d0). Vertical lines mark the golden ratio, (
√
5 − 1)/2, as shown in Fig. 4b. Different from
step functions, assuming sigmoid functions for eusocial birth and death rates confers ecological benefits
for the colony size below the threshold m, thus promoting the emergence of eusociality. In contrast,
assuming a step function for the probability to stay optimalizes the chance for eusociality to emerge
than any sigmoid function. Under sigmoid functions, there still exist critical solitary reproduction
rates such that no parameters of eusocial reproduction can lower the extinction probability (m ≥ 3).
Parameters: M = 100, mb = md = mq = m = 3, b = 2.45, a, c, and e: d = 0.05, b0 = 0.12, d0 = 0.1,
b, d, and f : d = 0, d0 = 0.1.
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Figure 7: Emergence of eusociality from population-size dependent branching processes. Shown are
the emergence probabilities of eusociality and solitary, starting with one single eusocial individual and
NS solitary individuals together (NS = 1, 10, 100, respectively). The branching process is dependent
on the total population size, X: the birth rates change as bi/(1 + ηX) while the death rates remain
constant. In this scenario, coexistence between eusocialty and solitary is impossible. There is good
agreement between predictions (solid lines) and simulations (circles). Parameters: η = 0.0001, b0 =
0.55, d0 = 0.45, b = 1− d, q = 1, m = 2, M = 2.
3.7 Model Extension III: Origins and Reversals of Eusociality
Let us consider the scenario where the branching process is dependent on the total population size
X: the birth rates are rescaled by a factor φ = 1/(1+ηX), b′i = φbi, with η > 0, and the death rates
remain unchanged. The parameter η quantifies the intensity of competition and determines the
upper bound of average population size. Coexistence between eusociality and solitary is impossible
for η > 0. Therefore, the extinction probabilities of solitary and eusociality (denoted by ps and
pe) calculated before are still relevant in this scenario. In particular, we can still use the extinction
probabilities calculated before (η = 0) to predict the evolutionary outcomes for small 0 < η  1. For
η = 0, coexistence happens with probability (1− pe)(1− ps), only solitary emerges while eusociality
goes extinction with probability pe(1 − ps), only eusociality emerges while solitary goes extinction
with probability ps(1−pe), and both species go extinction with probability pspe. Because extinction,
if fated to happen, takes place in short time scales for branching processes, the co-existent state that
happens with probability (1− pe)(1− ps) for η = 0 will be dominated by and eventually taken over
by the one having a higher R0 in the case of η > 0. For solitary reproduction, RS = φb0/d0; for
eusocial reproduction (M = m = 2 in Fig. S1), RE = φ
2bb0/[d(φb0 + d0)]. Substituting φ = d0/b0
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into the inequality of RE > 1, we obtain the critical ratio b/d above which eusociality dominates
over solitary,
b
d
> 2
b0
d0
. (27)
That being said, if b/d > 2b0/d0, then the emergence probability of eusociality and solitary is
1− pe and pe(1− ps), otherwise being ps(1− pe) and 1− ps, respectively. Figure S1 shows that this
approximation works well for small η  1 and for different initial numbers of solitary individuals. It
requires greater eusocial advantages for a single eusocial individual to take over a larger population
of solitary individuals (i.e., larger NS).
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Figure 8: Origins and reversals of eusociality. We simulate density-dependent branching processes
starting with one species almost at carrying capacity and calculate how likely a single mutant can
take over the entire population (i.e., emergence probability since coexistence is impossible). The left
panel (a) shows the emergence probability of a single eusocial mutant in a population of NS = 2223
solitary individuals. The right panel (b) shows the emergence probability of a single solitary mutant
in a eusocial population consisting of 452 colonies of size 1 and 698 colonies of size 2. As a comparison
baseline (neutral evolution), the probability that a single solitary individual takes over the entire
homogeneous population by random drift is approximately 2× 10−4, while that probability for a single
eusocial individual is approximately 8 × 10−4. It requires very large eusocial advantages to enable
successful invasion of eusociality, whereas only small solitary reproduction rates can lead to the reversal
of eusociality. Parameters: η = 0.0001, b = 1− d, b0 = 1− d0, q = 1, m = 2, M = 2, (a) fixed solitary
reproduction rates b0 = 0.55, d0 = 0.45, (b) fixed eusocial reproduction rates, b = 0.7, d = 0.3.
We further simulate the density-dependent branching processes starting with one species almost
at carrying capacity and calculate how likely a single mutant can take over the entire population.
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The simulations show that it requires very large eusocial advantages to enable successful invasion
of eusociality, whereas only small solitary reproduction rates can lead to the reversal of eusociality
(online appendix, Fig. S2). These results help to explain why there are so few origins of eusociality
but many subsequent losses in the social insects.
4 Discussion & Conclusion
We have calculated the extinction probabilities associated with solitary and eusocial reproductive
strategies. In general, we find that solitary life history strategies are less prone to extinction than
eusocial ones. Thus, solitary individuals are better at “risk management”. Our comparative results
on the risk of extinction further support the following conclusion: the emergence of eusociality is
difficult because it requires relatively large reproductive advantages over solitary strategies. Fur-
thermore, these pronounced advantages have to arise with the production of a small number of
workers. This finding is not unprecedented, and in fact, previous applications of birth-death models
have suggested that the origins of eusociality might be most likely to occur in situations with strong
ecological constraints favor cooperation (Avile´s 1999).
Moreover, we derive a closed-form supercritical condition for eusociality to have a non-zero
chance of emergence, if and only if the eusocial RE > 1, as given in Eq. 10. We show that this RE ,
although derived for the stochastic branching process, is exactly the same as the one obtained by
the deterministic model in Nowak et al. (2010). For eusociality to have a lower risk of stochastic
extinction than solitary, much higher reproductive advantages must exist than for eusocial queens to
simply have a larger RE than solitary females RS (Fig. 3). Provided sufficiently large reproductive
advantages, eusocial queens can always have a larger R0 than solitary, whereas only when the ratio
of solitary reproduction is lower than a critical value, b0/(b0 +d0) < rm, can eusociality have a lower
risk of extinction than solitary (Fig. 4). In other words, eusociality is more vulnerable to the risk of
extinction, even though eusocial reproduction can be very advantageous and solitary reproduction
is only slightly supercritical. This is an important new insight arising from the present work that
helps explains the rarity of eusociality.
In the relatively few eusocial species where the reproductive benefits have been studied, eusocial-
ity does appear to confer both higher reproductive output as well as increased offspring survivorship,
even with very small colony sizes. Examples of greater reproductive payoff for social species are rare,
but evidence from some socially polymorphic species suggest that social colonies do indeed have
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greater productivity than solitary nests (Smith et al. 2007) and can produce more reproductives
than solitary species (2-3 reproductive females in solitary L. albipes nests versus 12-20 reproductive
females in eusocial L. albipes nests; Cecile Plateaux-Quenu, personal communication (Plateaux-
Quenu 1993; Plateaux-Quenu et al. 2000)). Furthermore, nests with increased social complexity
often have a higher average productivity per female than solitary nests and/or may be less likely to
fail than solitary nests (reviewed in (Andersson 1984; Smith et al. 2007; Rehan et al. 2010; 2011)).
One of the oft-cited examples of the benefits of social living is that social species are able to
reduce their risk of parasitism and predation (Lin & Michener 1972; Evans 1977), which should lead
to higher rates of offspring survivorship. For example, Xylocopa sulcatipes females are capable of
producing both solitary and social nests. Social nests contain a secondary female that acts as a
guard at the nest entrance, and her presence significantly reduces the frequency of nest usurpation
by other, conspecific females in environments with limited nest-site availability (Stark 1992). Other
studies have demonstrated similar benefits in small carpenter bees (Ceratina spp., (Sakagami &
Maeta 1977; Rehan et al. 2010; 2011)).
Our initial analyses were based on a model of eusocial behavior where offspring dispersal rates
were not allowed to vary over the lifespan of a colony. This approximates a facultatively eusocial
colony where all daughters are capable both of reproducing on their own or remaining in the nest as
helpers. In this model, facultative eusociality is still capable of emerging with sufficient reproductive
payoff and intermediate values of q. These behavioral strategies are often observed in nature. For
example, some halictid bee species are capable of producing either reproductive daughters or workers
in the first brood depending on their local environment (Yanega 1988; Packer 1990; Plateaux-Quenu
1993; Soucy & Danforth 2002; Cronin & Hirata 2003; Field et al. 2010). Other species, such as
the halictid bee, Halictus rubicundus (Yanega 1988), and several wasp species (Haggard & Gamboa
1980; Greene 1984; Kolmes 1986), exhibit “graded” resource allocation strategies where first-brood
females are often a mix of workers and reproductives.
In another set of analyses, we allowed dispersal to vary throughout the lifespan of the colony.
We found that eusocial advantages are maximized when queens produce workers first, followed by
reproductives (Fig. 5). This is representative of an obligate eusocial colony with a reproductive
strategy where daughters initially produced are required to remain in the nest as workers, and are
therefore incapable of reproducing on their own. This strategy has evolved several times within the
social insects in the Apidae (honey bees, stingless bees, and bumble bees), in vespid wasps (in the
Vespinae), and in the ants (Michener 1974). Previous work has demonstrated that among species
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with an annual life history, this method of resource allocation is the most beneficial (Macevicz &
Oster 1976). Despite these increased benefits, obligate (i.e. advanced) eusociality is still relatively
rare in comparison to facultative (i.e. primitive) eusociality (reviewed in Kocher & Paxton (2014),
suggesting that facultative strategies might be a necessary step on the route to obligate eusociality.
Clearly, many social insect species have evolved much more elaborate forms of eusocial behavior
that have very high reproductive payoffs and potentially low mortality. These species have achieved
this success through a variety of different mechanisms. Regardless of these mechanisms, our model
demonstrates that the evolution of social behavior is difficult and high-risk, that the initial origins
of eusociality are likely to occur when small colonies can produce very high reproductive payoffs.
We have also demonstrated that there is likely to be a high rate of loss of eusociality within these
groups. However, once eusocial life histories have taken over the population, it is possible that more
complex forms of social behavior can evolve.
In summary, this work provides key insights into some of the ecological factors that impact the
origins of social behavior by demonstrating that (at least initially) eusocial strategies are high risk
with high reward.
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